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"CANNED" SOFTWARE WARRANTIES: CONCERNS
ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TRANSACTION
Peter Ackermant
I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of this comment is relatively narrow. It canvasses
some of the general concerns of buyers1 and sellers2 of mass-mar-
keted software, explores the conditions under which express war-
ranties might be created in this area, and inquires into the efficacy of
consequential damage limitations upon failure of a manufacturer to
uphold its end of a warranty agreement. In simpler terms, purchas-
ers of microcomputer software products are beginning to scrutinize
more carefully the representations made about software capabilities.
The intensely competitive nature of the software industry has led to
bold assertions about what these computer programs are able to ac-
complish, and thus it is important to have some idea as to whether
these assertions amount to express warranties. It is equally impor-
tant, in light of the tremendous economic losses that are possible
where programs fail to operate, to know the damages for which a
manufacturer might be responsible.3
The problem, however, is not a unitary one. A legal outcome
will largely depend upon which type of software is at issue, since
this will reveal much about the parties to the transaction, who was
in the best position to guard against consequential losses, and the
Copyright © Peter Ackerman 1989. All Rights Reserved.
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1. Buyers will be interchangeably referred to throughout this comment as "buyers,"
"consumers," and "users." This is done simply for the sake of linguistic flow, recognizing the
distinctions that exist between, e.g., consumers and commercial purchasers. The former are
generally considered to be at a bargaining disadvantage (and thus entitled to an extra measure
of legal protection), while the latter's bargains are often deferred to by courts as presumably
sophisticated transactions. It will briefly be noted, however, that commercial transactions
involving software can easily inhere to the advantage of the seller in terms of bargaining
sophistication.
2. Sellers will be interchangeably referred to as "sellers," "vendors," "developers,"
and "manufacturers," again, for linguistic flow. It is recognized here that several issues
might arise depending upon one's characterization of the parties to a transaction. It is be-
yond the scope of this article to delve into these differences.
3. We are speaking here, of course, about software packages other than those used for
recreational purposes, which are not generally associated with significant commercial losses.
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fairness of a particular risk allocation. The nature of a particular
program might also assist a court in its policy considerations, such
as the desirability of awarding consequential damages at the ex-
pense of discouraging innovation in an important area.
Truly "canned" software packages are those which are com-
paratively inexpensive and routine, such as word processors. These
types of programs are usually ready to run immediately, and require
little substantive input from the user. It is unlikely that these stan-
dard types of programs will pose much legal difficulty, since they
are not typically associated with major commercial losses in the
event of program failure. Replacement or general money damages
will ordinarily suffice to compensate the buyer. Further, as will be
seen, it is difficult for a software developer to anticipate the panoply
of uses to which a user is likely to put a basic canned software pro-
gram. This cuts in favor of the defendant in a suit for consequential
damages.
There are other, more sophisticated and specialized off-the-
shelf software packages which provide greater potential for serious
losses. Accounting packages, for example, comprise a significant
portion of office automation, and thus command a great deal of reli-
ance by many businesses. A catastrophic failure here could spell
doom for some businesses. The complexity of these programs war-
rants greater scrutiny (and possibly greater liability) of the devel-
oper, who has more reason to know of the potential for serious
harm if he has not taken adequate precautions. On the other hand,
the complexity of a product often provides justification for an allo-
cation of risk to the purchaser, assuming he is regarded as having
fairly assumed this risk. Furthermore, accounting packages are
highly configured by the user, which customization the developer
might not have anticipated. This cuts in favor of the defendant on
the consequential damages portion of a lawsuit.4
There are also mass-market tax packages and project manage-
ment programs. The liability exposure of such complex programs
should be of greater concern to developers. Users place trust in pro-
ject management programs, which encourage certain judgments.5
Likewise, tax programs give substantive guidance which the user is
4. The case of James A. Cummings, discussed infra, is illustrative of the weakness of
the buyer's case where he seeks consequential damages stemming from use of a program he
has customized himself. Cummings apparently configured his spreadsheet to do bid calcula-
tions. He did not check his numbers against a model in the manual, contrary to a warning in
the manual to do so. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Tarter, Publisher, SOFrLET'rER, Cam-
bridge, Mass. (Jan. 5, 1989).
5. Tarter, supra note 4.
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unlikely to check by manually performing the math on all his
figures (which would defeat the purpose of the program).6 In other
words, the risk of loss is more likely shifted to the developer with
respect to these types of programs, since the buyer takes them on
faith, and has no realistic means by which to verify his calculations
and results.7
The reader should keep in mind such differences in attempting
to predict the outcome of a case.
The microcomputer software industry is about ten years old.8
It is an industry which has grown at a rate unprecedented in the
history of innovation. One court, in apparent awe of the computer
industry phenomenon, observed:
Modem advancement in the industry built around [the com-
puter] has been so rapid both in terms of technology and utiliza-
tion, that the first commercially available general purpose
computer, the UNIVAC, initially employed by the Census Bu-
reau in 1951, has been reposing in the Smithsonian Institute since
1964 along with the Spirit of St. Louis.9
There are so many players in the software industry - programmers,
marketing executives, legal counsel, insurance underwriters, retail-
ers, publishers, and users - that no consensus exists with regard to
industry statistics. There is little argument, however, concerning
the impressive magnitude of hardware and software growth. One
interesting estimate is that in 1980 there were one million com-
puters on earth.10 This includes computers of every type, from
huge mainframes to the more generally familiar personal or
microcomputers. That number has doubled virtually every year
since then, to the point where there are now approximately twenty
million computers in use. It took the telephone seventy-five years to
reach that level. It took the automobile sixty years to reach that
level. And it took the computer only about five years to reach that
level.II
The concomitant rise in the software industry has been equally
impressive. The packaged PC software market has been character-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Telephone interviews with E. Ric Giardino, General Counsel, MicroPro Corp.
(Oct. 8, 1987) and Bob Cohen, General Counsel, Borland Corp. (Oct. 12, 1987).
9. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 726-27 (2d Cir. 1973).
10. Giardino, supra note 8.
11. Id.
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ized by nearly forty-eight percent growth per year.2 Packaged PC
software was a $4.1 billion industry in 1988-89.13
With barely enough time to have matured and settled into
clearly defined markets, there have been calls for the imposition of
restrictions and guidelines with respect to how the software indus-
try is run.1 4 One particular area of concern for both industry pro-
fessionals and consumers is the level of legal protection afforded
each group in the event of a significant program failure. The con-
cerns on both sides are quite legitimate; increasingly sophisticated
consumers are expecting high levels of quality and adequate reme-
dies for failed expectations, and industry executives insist upon an
equitable sharing of the risks inherent in complex products.
The means by which these concerns are transactionally
deployed involve warranties. There are several issues involving
warranties, the legal exigencies of which have been competently dis-
cussed by numerous commentators. The framework for analysis,
however, is consistent. Warranties must be discussed in the context
of their creation, exclusion or disclaimer, accompanying limitations
of remedies, and separate limitations of liability. This comment is
no exception, although the discussion is narrowly tailored to merely
highlight, rather than to attempt to resolve some of these issues in
the software area.
The focus will begin with a survey of the general concerns of
software vendors or developers. It is an attempt to assimilate
widely held, but seldom articulated impressions of a young indus-
try. Many of the views are predictable and valid, expressing fears of
overly-expectant consumers and technological limitations, as well
as liability for consequential damages.
Next, the concerns of small business users will briefly be ex-
plored. These, too, reveal natural reactions to exciting new products
which zealously promise to enhance lives and businesses. Consum-
ers validly expect to be highly satisfied with these products, and in
many cases they are not. The software market has not reacted
quickly enough to ward off the creation of consumer complaint and
watchdog groups, some of which have lobbied for state and federal
12. Information obtained by telephone from Software Publishers Association, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Jan. 20, 1989).
13. Id.
14. See, e-g., Calif Lawmaker Postpones Effort to Legislate Computer Warranties, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Aug. 4, 1986, at 102; Disclaiming 'as is' Software, COMPUTERWORLD, July
21, 1986, at 23; Software and the Law, PC WEEK, Oct. 7, 1986, at 79; Who's Responsible for
the Bugs?, PC WEEK, May 27, 1986, at 51.
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Following will be a look at express warranties and associated
remedies for breach. Express warranties are easily created (inten-
tionally or not) and are difficult to exclude, particularly where the
buyer is left with no meaningful remedy. Thus, software packages
sold "as is," without so much as a "repair or replacement" provi-
sion, could place the manufacturer in a difficult liability position.
Separate reference will be made to manufacturer liability limita-
tions, specifically exclusions from liability for consequential dam-
ages. This is an unsettled area of the law, of which vendors and
users alike should be aware.
Throughout this discussion, it is assumed that the Uniform
Commercial Code applies to sales of canned software packages.
This serves both to simplify matters and as a prediction of judicial
treatment of software transactions, which have all the appearances
of conventional sales of goods. 6 Since there presently are no re-
ported cases dealing with non-negotiated canned software failures,
U.C.C. cases serve as useful analogies.
Also absent from this discussion are the implied warranties of
merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose.
As to merchantability, U.C.C. section 2-314(1) provides, in rel-
evant part:
Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale
if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
(Emphasis added.)
Since it is assumed that the U.C.C. applies, it is further assumed
that section 2-316 has been complied with, the implied warranty of
merchantability thus having effectively been excluded.
15. See generally Hearing, infra note 20.
16. This is not to detract from the efforts of those who maintain that software does not
fit within the framework of the U.C.C. While the physical diskette upon which program is
stored is clearly a "good," it requires much more imagination to characterize the magnetic
data stored on the disks as "goods" (and, indeed, the data a program is capable of generating,
which is not even in existence at the time of the sale). For good coverage of the issue, see
generally Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking
a Byte Out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U.L. Rav. 129 (1985). Software is also technically
"leased," as opposed to "sold," the manufacturer thereby retaining proprietary rights. The
coverage of the U.C.C. has traditionally been regarded as extending only to "sales." But see
U.C.C. § 2-102: "[T]his article applies to transactions in goods" (emphasis added). See also
Article 2A, Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act at U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d, I Current
Materials, 2A101 (Callaghan) (July 1988) (proposed for uniform state adoption and in-
tended to alleviate many classification problems where a technical lease has all the appear-
ances of a sale).
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As to fitness for a particular purpose, U.C.C. section 2-315
provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for such purpose. (Emphasis added.)
Again, it is assumed that this warranty has effectively been
excluded.
Finally, the last main section offers some suggestions for ven-
dors and users. There are many steps that can be taken on both
sides of the transaction both to mollify the concerns of the other,
and to protect one's own position. These will briefly be explored in
terms ranging from common sense to legal pragmatism.
II. CONCERNS OF SOFTWARE VENDORS
Industry professionals are concerned about potential problems
arising from conflicts between consumer expectations and product
capability, substantive program errors, and liability for consequent-
ial, or "lost profits" damages.
It seems axiomatic that the expectations of a consumer ought
to be fulfilled by a product sold to him on the basis of his purported
needs. If you tell a salesman that you want clean clothes, and he
sells you a washing machine, your clothes ought to come out clean.
If you want sharp pencils and wind up purchasing a pencil sharp-
ener, your pencils ought to come out sharp. Computer software,
however, poses a unique problem. It operates wholly in conjunction
with the user, to perform a variety of specified tasks depending
upon the desired result. In this sense, software is written flexibly, to
conform to the demands of the user in a given situation. Manufac-
turers will thus identify general tasks in the development stage,
leaving it to the user to manipulate the program to conform to the
user's particular needs. As such, according to several manufactur-
ers, it is virtually impossible to delineate every application of a par-
ticular program. 7 It is thus up to the consumer to either identify
specific applications and ensure that a selected program will satisfy
those needs through self-education, or accept the risk that his needs
could not have been completely accounted for in a mass-marketed
17. Giardino & Cohen, supra note 8.
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piece of software.18
It is possible that as more and more people begin to use com-
puters, off-the-shelf software will proliferate to the point at which
highly individualized needs will be satisfied. Single-need/single-ca-
pability software would pose less risk of misunderstanding or
heightened expectations on the part of the consumer. The present
reality, however, is that multi-task programs are the most effective
way of exploiting the efficiencies of machines over human minds.
Single program packages tend to address multiple problems in short
spans of time, which is what seems to interest production-oriented
people the most.
Manufacturers are nonetheless concerned that consumers are
overly enthusiastic about the ability of software programs automati-
cally to solve every problem. Since the products are not designed to
run by themselves, the user must invest significant amounts of time
to bring the program's capabilities into conformity with his expecta-
tions. 9 According to one industry executive, "success of a com-
puter system is. . .contingent upon the effort the user makes to
acquire a knowledge to make utility happen."20 It is therefore cru-
cial, according to industry executives, that software consumers
carefully educate themselves prior to purchasing a program, in or-
der to have a clearer picture of the ability of a particular program to
solve their particular needs.
Software manufacturers do not feel that they should be the in-
surers of people who rely upon complex technology without taking
measures to ensure the accuracy of their program results. Indeed, a
number of manufacturers consider program accuracy as much a
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Informational Hearing on Computers and Warranty Protection for Consumers, Sac-
ramento, California, Oct. 9, 1985, at 254 (Joint Publications Office, Sacramento, Ca.) (herein-
after Hearing) (comments of Mr. Markle, Western Computer Dealers Ass'n.). Mr. Markle
elaborated upon the "significant consumer responsibility" he sees in the symbiotic consumer-
manufacturer relationship in the retail software area: "[F]ailure to prepare can be prepara-
tion to fail. For example, before purchasing a computer for serious use, the shopper should
know what a computer is, how it relates to the user as a programmable tool .... Number two,
what his requirements are - a considered performance specification derived from the analy-
sis of work he needs done. Number three, what his system should be in the context of his
performance specification, a solution system comprised of computer hardware, software, and
also procedures, people and other resources, as well as specifications for expandability.
Number four, support requirements, including installation, training, on-site and depot main-
tenance services. Number five, approximately how much time must be invested in training
and/or self-study before being able to operate the functions for which the computer consumer
is investing his money." Id. at 271. Consider, also, the comment of Jeffrey Tarter, supra note
4: "You don't buy a car (having not taken the time to learn how to drive), get into an acci-
dent, and sue the manufacturer."
1989]
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part of the software consumer's responsibility as their own. In an
informational hearing before Assemblywoman Gloria Molina of
California, for example, one software developer testified about the
importance of good customer relations to the maintenance of prod-
uct quality.2 In describing the process of testing for errors, he
stated that "if you are effective, a relationship with your customer
[would in essence say that] we need you guys to test this for us,
because it is complex. We can't find everything that's wrong with it
the first time it goes out the door. And so, please call us. Send us
your reports with any errors that you find." 22
Many industry professionals are concerned about bearing the
total risk for program errors which they consider to be generally
beyond their control. Some regard program errors as being virtu-
ally inevitable, due to the fact that "humans are involved in the
creation of software."23 There are also those who, more specifically,
contend that the prospect for potentially serious "bugs" 2 4 increases
substantially with the complexity of a program, and that concomi-
tant problems with error detection exist. 25 While it is true that a
variety of methods exist to weed out and correct most programming
errors,26 at least one qualified commentator has suggested that de-
spite these various safeguards, the combination of influences that
can adversely affect a program warrant the conclusion that "there
21. See Hearing, supra note 20, at 181 (comments of Sherwin Steffin, Chief Executive
Officer, Brainpower, Inc.).
22. Id.
23. See Legal Liability of Computer System Suppliers and Users, 1978 Annual Meeting,
Wash. D.C., COMPUTER LAW ASS'N (March 6, 1978) at 4 (hereinafter Meeting).
24. A "bug" is basically an error in a computer program's code, which is capable of
either frustrating effective use of the program to its full potential, or rendering it completely
inoperable. A bug in a program is capable not only of frustrating the program itself, but it
could also cause the data being generated to suffer - and possibly to destroy it. See infra
note 42.
25. Giardino & Cohen, supra note 8. See also Gemignani, Product Liability and
Software, 8 J. oF COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 173, 181-87 and accompanying notes (1981). For
a dramatic example of program complexity and the potential for enormous miscalculations,
albeit not of the "canned" variety, see Hertz, SDI Demands Trillions of Instructions,
99.9999999 Percent Reliability, COMPUTERWORLD, June 2, 1986, at 17. For other examples,
see A Micro-Macro Measure of Software Complexity, J. Sys. SoFTWARE, Sept. 1987, at 213;
User's Rising Expectations Seen Spurring Software Crisis, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 24, 1984,
at 25 ("Many software designers experience two major problems. First, as the complexity of
the program increases, each error is more difficult to extract. Second, corrections made to the
program at the end of the development process are likely to create new errors somewhere in
the program.") Even programs guaranteed to be up and running 99.9 percent of the time
will, by mathematical definition, be "down" for approximately 8.76 hours per year. 99% "up
time" means 87.6 hours of "down time" per year. Interview with Rick Ehrhart, Computer
Programming Consultant, CWA Comm. Prod., Inc., Los Gatos, Ca. (Oct. 14, 1987).
26. See Gemignani, supra note 25, at 185 n.35.
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always remains some chance of catastrophic failure."2 7 He goes on
to submit that "[i]t is not a question of whether there is some risk,
but of whether the level of risk is acceptable."2 Accepting the
technological limitations inherent in software development, there is
a good argument in favor of limiting the liability of the manufac-
turer, who is constrained from improving his product beyond a cer-
tain point.
Another concern of software vendors relating to the possibility
of substantive program failures is the symphony of configurations
required to run a program. In order to be rendered functional,
software must be joined with compatible hardware, operating sys-
tems, and sometimes applications programs. 29 An error or power
surge at any point along the electronic chain can "crash" a pro-
gram, and possibly destroy a data file.3" These types of problems
are more within the control of the user and should not add to the
manufacturer's liability.
Many software manufacturers are willing to fix or replace pro-
grams that are shown to have "repeatable" errors; that is, if a pro-
gram failure can be recreated, this is sufficient evidence of a flaw in
the vendor's product, and will usually be corrected. Ofie industry
executive has publicly stated that it is his company's policy to fix
repeatable errors at no charge, considering this a cost of doing busi-
ness.a" "We view our customers as corporate assets," he said, "and
we feel it's in the best interest of the corporation to provide this
level of support."'3 2 Still, the tendency of many consumers is to
point the finger at the software manufacturer with little understand-
ing of or concern for the possibility of alternative causes for failures,
and this concerns many in the industry - particularly in light of the
frequent appearance and disappearance from the market of various
computer products and support services which contribute to (or de-
tract from) the use of many software programs.33 To the extent the
user can take measures to avoid these pitfalls, another argument
emerges in support of limiting the liability of a manufacturer.
The concerns discussed above deal with the information gap
27. Gemignani, supra note 25, at 187.
28. Id.
29. See Gemignani, supra note 25. See also Hearing, supra note 20, at 200 ("90 percent
of the problems are bugs in the operating system." Comments of Harold Spice, Chief Execu-
tive Officer, Paradyme Software Corp.).
30. Hearing, supra note 20, at 200.
31. Hearing, supra note 20, at 198 (comments of Harold Spice).
32. Id.
33. Giardino & Cohen, supra note 8.
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that often exists between software manufacturers and technologi-
cally unsophisticated consumers. Customers who know the idio-
syncratic functions of their businesses often lack the knowledge of
computers and computer equipment clearly to identify their needs
or fully to explore the capabilities and limitations of their software.
Equally difficult for the supplier is the task of satisfying every user
for every conceivable application of a computer program.34 One
must carefully consider, however, the nature of the program under
consideration. As already discussed, there is a major difference be-
tween "ordinary" canned software, and those programs which re-
quire significant user interaction and manipulation. The more a
user has engaged in program customization, the more fairly he may
be charged with the risk of error.
Perhaps the most troubling area of concern for the software
manufacturer is the amount of damages owed to the buyer in the
event of a loss on the merits of a complaint. Vendors consider con-
sequential damages for economic loss suffered due to a program
failure completely unreasonable responses to what they see as con-
sumer risk-sharing in an evolutionary market. Such a market,
many manufacturers believe, is a joint venture of sorts between con-
sumer and producer, with significant risk management responsibili-
ties on both sides. 35 The microcomputer industry is peculiar in that
it is so dynamic; products are in continuous and various stages of
development. Thus, according to several software manufacturers,
the industry is too young to warrant the kinds of reactions that re-
sult in heavy consequential damage awards. They believe they
should be able freely to restrict their liability, lest relatively new and
experimental products be thwarted or destroyed.
III. CONCERNS OF SMALL BUSINESS USERS
The first factor to be considered is that users often tend to
think they have a cognizable claim when software fails to perform
in accordance with their general expectations. Consider, for exam-
ple, some common advertisements for various software packages:
"NewsMaster is so easy to use, you'll be mixing text lines, boxes
and clip art into multicolumn, multipage documents in less than an
34. See Rumbelow, Liability for Programming Errors, 9 INT'L. Bus. LAW. 303 (1981).
35. Giardino & Cohen, supra note 8. But consider the comment of former California
Assemblywoman Gloria Molina: "If I wanted to share in the risk or the growth [of a com-
puter company], I would have bought its stock, not its computer." Hearing, supra note 20, at
126.
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hour!";36 "A breakthrough in micro software power and flexibility
means never having to replace your business accounting software
again! Get All the Power You'll Ever Need - Once and For All!";37
"If you have to move heaven and earth, the best project manage-
ment software can make a world of difference. Harvard Total Pro-
ject Manager II (HTPM II) lets you manage important projects
faster and easier, with earth-shaking new features.";38 "Turbo C:
The fastest, most efficient and easy-to-use C compiler at any
price."39 Common sense would tell us that converting such repre-
sentations to colorable legal claims is similar to suing the author of
a book on how to improve your life, if your life has not been
improved.4°
But performance representations of a more specific nature are
far more serious. As we shall see, the more relevant to product
performance and specific a statement or representation, the more
likely it is to have created an express warranty.41 Far from being
interested in such legal niceties, though, many users are simply ag-
gravated by frequent disappointments with quality, complexity, and
support service. A few examples: Lotus Development Corpora-
tion's Symphony program, advertised as "[t]he complete business
software integrating 1-2-3 spreadsheet technology with word
processing, graphics, database and communications," was plagued
with a flaw which killed data when users tried to move certain
figures;42 Microsoft's Multiplan, a business applications program,
has deleted data when users tried to print it out;4 3 Apple's Mac-
Write word processing program was found to have a bug which
froze the program whenever the backspace key was hit, forcing the
user to turn his computer on and off several times to get it working
again.44
Perhaps the apex of consumer frustration is represented by the
"User's Bill of Rights", an outline of concepts deemed fundamental
to what it is that users expect, and what they feel they are entitled to
get from the software industry. It was promulgated by the Capital
36. PC MAGAZINE, May 12, 1987, at 74.
37. Id. at 93.
38. Id. at 333.
39. Id. at 1.
40. See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text regarding the creation of express
warranties.
41. Id.
42. See Bugs Come In All Sizes - And Are Tough to Destroy, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1985,
at 33.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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PC User Group, a consumer organization based near Washington,
D.C, and while not binding on anyone, the list has identified the
major areas of concern for software users:
1. Users have the right to expect products to perform as
advertised.
2. A product should perform the basic functions common to its
genre at a level of quality consistent with industry standards.
3. Users have the right to make backup copies of software to
ensure uninterrupted use of the program should the original
copy fail.
4. Manufacturers have an obligation to inform users of known
errors, bug fixes, and temporary work-arounds and to pro-
vide periodic updates to correct errors.
5. Users have the right to integrate software into their system
environments without undue constraint by copy protection,
authorization requirements, or extraneous functions added
to the software.45
The first "right" appears to reflect existing express warranty law,
while the second aspires to eliminate the ability of a manufacturer
to exclude implied warranties.
Finally, there remains the ever-present potential for significant
commercial losses in the event of a substantial program failure. The
first case to have raised many eyebrows in the software industry was
that of James A. Cummings, Inc." Cummings, a construction
company in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, calculated a bid for a project
using Lotus Development's Symphony program. Cummings got the
job, and subsequently discovered that it had underbid the project by
$254,000.00. This deficiency was blamed by Cummings on what it
believed to be a bug in the software used to calculate the bid. A
lawsuit followed, for which Cummings sought consequential dam-
ages from Lotus. Although the suit was withdrawn, the seed was
planted for this type of high-cost liability litigation.47
A recent case with even greater potential significance is Geo-
physical Sys. Corp. v. Seismograph Serv. Corp.," which resulted in a
45. See PC WORLD, Dec. 1987, at 474.
46. James A. Cummings, Inc. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., No. 86-6148, slip op. at 2-3 (S.D.
Fla. filed May 5, 1986).
47. See Liability Case Against Lotus Raises Fears In Industry, INFoWORLD, July 28,
1986, at 1; Firm Sues Lotus, Claiming Software Fault Led to Loss, Wall St. J., July 29, 1986,
at 15; Software Liability Suit is Withdrawn, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1986, at D8. See also
Reece, Liability For Defective Computer Software, 5 COMPUTER L. REP. 853 (1987).
48. No. CV-85-8359 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1988).
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$48.3 million jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.49 Geophysical
claimed, inter alia, that the seismic data processing software it
purchased from Seismograph was flawed, causing Geophysical sub-
stantial loss of business.50 Assuming full consideration on appeal
(since there was no judicial elaboration of the legal issues at trial),
the final disposition of this case will have a considerable impact in
the area of software liability litigation.51 A closer look at the sub-
stantive law may enhance one's ability to predict the outcome.
IV. EXPRESS WARRANTIES AND CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGE LIMITATIONS
A. Express Warranties
1. Creation
Section 2-313 of the U.C.C. provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express war-
ranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that ,
the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's
opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty.
Presumably, then, if one were to purchase a software package which
is represented as suitable for use with a certain amount of computer
memory, which operates at a certain speed, or which has been sold
on the basis of a demonstration, remedy should be had for breach of
49. See Bulkeley, Raytheon Unit Ordered by Jury to Pay Award of $48.3 Million to
Geophysical, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1988 at B6 col. 3.
50. Id.
51. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 146-63 and accompanying text.
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an express warranty as to those particular features, should they fail
to accord with the representations. 2 It should be borne in mind by
a purchaser, however, that these express warranties will usually be
held to apply only to the features specifically mentioned, and will
preclude recovery for the nonperformance of other aspects of the
program.5
3
On the other hand, the seller should bear in mind the absolute
ease with which express warranties might be created. Facts,
promises, descriptions, and models are simply express characteriza-
tions of quality and performance, and there are a variety of methods
for projecting them, including brochures, ads, product labels, and
order forms.54 Furthermore, it is possible that even if the buyer
does not fully understand the technicalities of program specifica-
tions, but is nonetheless sufficiently impressed by them, their mere
existence could provide him with an express warranty. Comment 5
to Section 2-313 suggests this:
A description need not be by words. Technical specifications,
blueprints and the like can afford more exact description than
mere language and if made part of the basis of the bargain goods
must conform with them.55
It is unclear whether the "basis of the bargain" provision of
Section 2-313 requires that the buyer actually have relied upon
product representations to gain the benefit of express warranty pro-
tection. There is a split of authority on this issue. 6 There is, how-
ever, considerable strength to the argument that reliance by the
buyer is a relaxed requirement (if a requirement at all) under the
Code. The foundation for this theory is reflected in the linguistic
changes of the U.C.C. from the Uniform Sales Act it supplanted,
and the Code's accompanying official comments.
The Uniform Sales Act provided that express warranties would
arise if the buyer was induced to purchase in reliance upon factual
representations or promises.57 The U.C.C. changed this to provide
52. Chandler, Computer Transactions: Potential Liability of Computer Users and Ven-
dors, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 432 (1977).
53. Id.
54. See Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 COR-
NELL L. REv. 30, 48 (1978). See also F. COOPER, LAW AND THE SoFTWARE MARKETER
128-29 (1988).
55. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 5 (1976).
56. See Special Project, supra note 54, at 50-59, and cases cited therein. See also Note,
"Basis of the Bargain"- What Role Reliance?, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 145 (1972); Comment,
The Meaning of "Part of the Basis of the Bargain," 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 447 (1979).
57. "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer
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that express warranties would arise if promises or affirmations of
fact formed part of the "basis of the bargain."" s Comment 3 at-
tempts to clarify this change, though it still falls short of offering
any definitions:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller are re-
garded as part of the description of those goods; hence no partic-
ular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave
them into the fabric of the agreement.5 9
In any event, it seems clear that the focus has shifted from the
state of mind or conduct of the buyer (who formerly had to prove
reliance), to the representations of the seller. Comment 4 affirms
this notion by reiterating the purpose of warranty law, which is to
determine "what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell."60
At most it may be said that the Code is willing to presume buyer
reliance upon express representations, leaving it to the seller to
show clear affirmative proof to the contrary.61
Note here the potential significance of the type of software at
issue, and the individual purchasing it. These factors will surely
make a difference. It is unlikely, for example, that seller representa-
tions will have contributed much, if anything, to the purchasing de-
cision of a user highly sophisticated in the use of complex software
and who has prior experience with its capabilities (or perhaps
knowledge of contrary capabilities). This will depend, of course,
upon the weight of evidence. Contrast that scenario with the small
businessman with no prior computer experience, purchasing a
software package for the first time. The latter is far more likely to
be justified in basing his purchasing decision upon manufacturers'
representations, and thus more likely to gain the benefit of express
warranty protection.
These factors will also bear directly upon whether the buyer
was justified in viewing the seller's representations as fact, as op-
to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." UNIF. SALES
AcT § 12 (1906).
58. U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a) (1976).
59. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3 (1976). See also U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 6 (1976): "In
general, the presumption is that any sample or model just as any affirmation of fact is in-
tended to become a basis of the bargain."
60. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1976).
61. Comment 3 to Section 2-313 further states that any fact which is to take the seller's
affirmations out of the agreement "requires clear affirmative proof." Comment 6 provides
that while samples or models presumptively become a basis of the bargain, "there is no escape
from the question of fact." See also 3 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-313:49
at 43 (3d ed. 198.3).
1989]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
posed to opinion or commendation, the latter being excluded from
the rubric of Section 2-313 by definition.
U.C.C. Section 2-313(2) states that "an affirmation merely of
the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the
seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty."62 The distinction between fact and opinion has never
been unequivocally defined, perhaps owing to the inherent difficulty
of such an endeavor.6 3 In the context of computer software, the
"reasonable person" standard often applied to the "puffery" issue
might pose some difficulty for an uninitiated judge or jury, given the
complexities of many standard program descriptions. Yet even
though it may be difficult for one with no computer experience to
determine whether a representation is fact or opinion, a defense on
this score is unlikely to prevail if it can be rationally borne out that
information conveyed was specific in nature," if it related explicitly
to the goods in question,65 and it was reasonable in the circum-
stances for the buyer to have relied upon the information in making
the purchase.66 Certainly in the context of computer software,
there is not much other than program performance that can be rep-
resented, as the product has no aesthetic or other tangential value to
the prospective buyer.
But note again the factors to be considered. Some software
packages are so new in their applications as to be almost experimen-
tal in nature. While this should not, by itself, determine the
(non)existence of a warranty,67 a sophisticated buyer with first-hand
knowledge of such circumstances might fairly be charged with the
risk that no express warranty existed to protect him.68 The vendor
would at least wish to argue this, in combination with the social
62. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (1976).
63. See Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 1984).
64. Id. See also WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 330 (2d ed. 1980).
65. Id. at 328-29.
66. Id. Other suggested guidelines for drawing the distinction between fact and opinion
have included the susceptibility of an assertion to verification, whether it was written or oral,
and the degree of certainty with which it was set forth. Comment, Consumer Warranty Law
in California Under the Commercial Code and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson.Moss War-
ranty Acts, 26 UCLA L. REv. 583, 598 (1979), citing WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 64, at
274-76.
67. See Special Project, supra note 54 at 65-66.
68. Id. See also General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.
1972) ("The test for whether a given representation is a 'warranty' or a mere expression of
opinion is: did the seller assume to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or did he
merely express a judgment about a thing as to which they may each be expected to have an
opinion." (citing Wedding v. Duncan, 310 Ky. 374, 220 S.W.2d 564 (1969))).
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policy-of encouraging innovation. Even with respect to other kinds
of programs, the vendor will wish to point out that commercial
transactions invariably include the expectation of zealous salesman-
ship, and a purchaser who submissively gives way to everything he
is told must assume the risk of his acquiescence. 69 This squares
with an additional policy - namely, that a consumer who has had
the opportunity to shop around and compare may be fairly charged
with the risk that a chosen product will fail to meet his economic
expectations.7 °
The buyer, by contrast, will rely upon the theme of fairness
running throughout the Code.71 The change in emphasis away
from buyer reliance suggests that the buyer might be able to claim
the protection of express warranties of which he was not even
aware. This will become an important argument in the context of
warranties which reside inside the box, which do not come to the
buyer's attention until after the purchase. The California Supreme
Court, in Hauter v. Zogarts,72 took a stab at this concept by noting,
in dictum, that a buyer's lack of reliance alone will not take a
seller's affirmation out of the agreement; thus, once an affirmation is
made by the seller, "he cannot avoid liability for selling lower grade
goods. No longer can he find solace in the fact that the injured
consumer never saw his warranty."73
2. Disclaimer
Section 2-313 of the U.C.C. provides, in part:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consis-
tent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) nega-
tion or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such con-
struction is unreasonable.
Software developers are thus constrained, in view of the Code, from
69. "The law recognizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the value and quali-
ties of the articles which they have to sell." Kimball v. Bangs, 144 Mass. 321, 324, 11 N.E.
113, 114 (1887).
70. Unless, of course, the manufacturer or seller agrees to assume this risk. See Seeley
v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965).
71. See generally Comment, supra note 56.
72. 14 Cal. 3d 104, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
73. Hauter, 14 Cal. 3d at 116 n.12, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 688 n.12. See also Donaldson,
Affirmations or Representations Made After the Sale is Closed as Basis of Warranty Under
U.C.C. Section 2-313(1)(a), 47 A.L.R.4th 200 (1988).
1989]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
making any promises they cannot fulfill.74 To the extent that a
clause in the contract (or license agreement) disclaims a previously
stated specific description, no reasonable construction by a court
could render these two provisions consistent with one another, and
the disclaimer would fail.75 A literal reading of the Code thus war-
rants the conclusion that language "which otherwise would create
an express warranty shall not be denied effect by words of
disclaimer."76
A simple illustration of this point is provided by Consolidated
Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Systems.77 There, Consoli-
dated was found to have relied upon defendant's detailed specifica-
tions of computer terminal performance - specifically, that the
Regent 100 terminals would operate at 19,200 baud.7" Defendant's
written warranty, however, provided only for a ninety-day guaran-
tee against defects in material and workmanship, excluding any
other express or implied warranties.7 9 The court was not interested
in whether the failure of the terminals to operate at the promised
speed constituted defects in "materials" or "workmanship," since it
found that the express warranty disclaimer gave way to the war-
ranty created by the detailed specifications:
Where a contract includes both specific warranty language and a
general disclaimer of warranty liability, the former prevails over
the latter where the two cannot reasonably be reconciled... An
attempt to both warrant and refuse to warrant goods creates an
ambiguity which can only be resolved by making one term yield
to the other. . .Section 2-316(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code provides that warranty language prevails over the dis-
74. See Ducker, Liability for Computer Software, 26 Bus. LAW. 1081, 1089 (1971).
75. Id.
76. Id., citing Note, Contract Draftsmanship Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 564, 581-82 (1964).
77. 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 391. Note here that although the court spoke the language of reliance, an
express warranty would undoubtedly have been found to exist using strict basis of the bargain
analysis, given the unequivocal and highly specific nature of the representation.
79. The warranty, in relevant part, provided: ADDS warrants each new communica-
tions and terminal product manufactured by it to be free from defects in material and work-
manship under normal use and service for a period of 90 days from the date of shipment.
ADDS MAKES NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED; AND ANY
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE WHICH EXCEEDS THE FOREGO-
ING WARRANTY IS HEREBY DISCLAIMED BY ADDS AND EX-
CLUDED FROM ANY AGREEMENT MADE BY ACCEPTANCE OF
ANY ORDER PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT.
Consolidated, 708 F.2d at 391 n.5.
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claimer, if the two cannot be reasonably reconciled. "
"As is" provisions, which purport to nullify any and all war-
ranties (and thus in effect insulate the seller from all liability, to be
discussed below), are unlikely to prevail over otherwise valid ex-
press warranties. It is counter-intuitive to presume that express
representations of quality made by a seller could be disclaimed.
This accords with the Drafters' Comment as to the purpose of Sec-
tion 2-316:
This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent
clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude "all warranties,
express or implied." It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected
and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such
language when inconsistent with language of express warranty
and permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by con-
spicuous language or other circumstances which protect the
buyer from surprise.'s
While one of the basic tenets of contract law is the freedom to
shift the risk of loss or damage, 2 it is delusionary to expect judicial
reception to one-sided non-negotiated warranty provisions. Many
vendors of packaged software are coming to realize this.13 On this
note, the court in A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 4 where a
machine purchased for processing the plaintiff's tomato crop failed
to operate properly and no meaningful remedy was provided for in
the standard warranty, stated:
[S]ince a product's performance forms the fundamental basis for
a sales contract, it is patently unreasonable to assume that a
buyer would purchase a standardized mass-produced product
from an industry seller without any enforceable performance
standards. s5
An extended discussion of Section 2-316's reference to Section
2-202 (parol evidence) is not attempted, except to note that parol
80. Consolidated, 708 F.2d at 391 (citing both U.C.C. § 2-316 and Wilson Trading
Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 405, 244 N.E.2d 685, 689 (1968)).
81. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 (1976).
82. See generally Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365 (1921). With
regard to risk shifting, the court in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 737, 747, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838, 845 (1976) had this to say: "Judicial paternalism is to
loss shifting what garlic is to stew - sometimes necessary to give full flavor to statutory law,
always distinctly noticeable in its result, overwhelmingly counterproductive if excessive, and
never an end in itself."
83. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations (ADPSO) Memorandum,
April 18, 1986; PC WORLD, July 1987, at 316.
84. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
85. Id. at 491, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
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representations amounting to express warranties might validly be
excluded by effective merger or integration clauses.8 6 This is one
method of disclaiming an express warranty (keeping in mind that
canned software is often marketed on the basis of written represen-
tations or demonstrations)., 7 The only other method available to
the seller to avoid express warranty application is effectively to ne-
gate the presumption that his affirmations contributed to the basis
of the bargain.
B. Limitations of Remedies and Consequential Damage
Exclusions
Disclaimers of warranties deal with sellers' attempts to limit
situations in which they can be held for a breach, whereas limita-
tions of liability assume that a breach has already occurred, and
seek only to limit the remedies available to the plaintiff.8" Given the
potential for enormous liability in the event of a catastrophic pro-
gram failure, it is the issue of liability limitation which interests
most vendors.
Comment 1 to U.C.C. Section 2-719 states that "it is the very
essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies
be available." 9 A vendor who thus offers a product to the general
public with a warranty provision which actually (or in effect) ex-
cludes him from all liability for failure of the product to perform,
will be hard pressed to justify such a provision.
Former California Assemblywoman Gloria Molina, who was
herself disappointed by a computer purchase, introduced legislation
which would have imposed minimum warranty guidelines on the
software industry in her state. In view of this, and largely in reac-
tion to the supplications of the Association of Data Processing Ser-
vice Organizations (ADAPSO) to prevent the bill's passage, many
software vendors have shifted from "as is" provisions, to providing
the exclusive remedies of repair or replacement for defective prod-
ucts.90 Accompanying these exclusive remedies are usually separate
clauses which preclude manufacturer liability for consequential
damages.91 The center stage for legal conflict is in this area; the
86. For an extended discussion of this, see Special Project, supra note 54, at 176-80.
87. See J. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW, § 3.13 at 92 (1983).
88. A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 481 n.3, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118 n.3 (1982).
89. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1976).
90. PC MAGAZINE, July 1987, at 316.
91. For example:
IN NO EVENT SHALL [ABC COMPANY] BE LIABLE FOR ERRORS
OR OMISSIONS CONTAINED IN ITS SOFTWARE OR MANUAL, ANY
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efficacy of consequential damage exclusions is called into question
where manufacturers fail to fulfill their warranty obligations.
We are primarily concerned here with the prospect for conse-
quential damage recovery by purchasers of off-the-shelf software,
for which no contract or warranty terms have been negotiated.
Again, however, the analysis given by courts in arms-length bargain
situations will be instructive to the extent that they survey the
framework of the U.C.C.
U.C.C. section 2-719(1) gives a seller permission to contractu-
ally limit the buyer's remedies.92 Such limitations on remedies will
stand, under the Code, so long as they don't "fail of their essential
purpose."93 For example, where a warranty provides that the
buyer's sole remedy will be "repair or replacement of defective
parts," and the seller is either unwilling or unable to repair or re-
place, most courts will hold that the exclusive remedy has "failed of
its essential purpose."" If there is a "failure of essential purpose,"
then the floodgates of Code remedies will open up to the buyer.95
Or will they? Case law and commentary vary as to the proper rela-
tionship between clauses which limit a buyer's remedies, and sepa-
rate provisions exempting the seller from liability for consequential
damages.96 In other words, where a breach of warranty occurs, ex-
actly what may the buyer expect to recover as damages, in the face
of a consequential damages exclusion?
As already mentioned, U.C.C. Subsection 2-719(1) provides
authority for a seller to limit the remedies of a buyer. Subsections
2-719(2) and (3) limit this privilege by giving the buyer two inroads
INTERRUPTIONS OF SERVICE, A LOSS OF BUSINESS OR ANTICI-
PATORY PROFITS AND/OR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE FURNISHING, PERFORM-
ANCE OR USE OF THESE MATERIALS.
Leading Edge Products, Inc., word processor warranty, 1984.
92. "mhe agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable
under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment
of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts." U.C.C. § 2-
719(1)(a) (1976).
93. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1976).
94. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); RRX
Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
95. The basis for arguments in this regard is the language of U.C.C. § 2-719(2) allowing
remedies "as provided in this Act."
96. Compare Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1086 (holding that a limited remedy of repair and a
consequential damages exclusion "are not mutually exclusive") with Soo Line R.R. Co. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that "a remedial limitation's
failure of essential purpose makes available all contractual remedies, including consequential
damages").
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to damages beyond those the warranty provides. Subsection 2-
719(2) states:
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail
of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Act.
Subsection 2-719(3) states:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not.
A literal reading of these two subsections would seem to war-
rant the conclusion that the validity of an exclusive remedy is tested
according to whether it fulfills its essential purpose, and the validity
of a consequential damages exclusion is tested according to whether
it is unconscionable.97 In other words, the Code contemplates a
situation where consequential damages will still be barred (assum-
ing there's a clause in the contract to that effect) despite the fact
that an exclusive remedy has failed of its essential purpose. In such
a case, the language of subsection 2-719(2) referring to the remedy
which may be had "as provided in this Act" would refer to the
menu of general damage options provided in Code Section 2-711,98
without disturbing the independent nature of Section 2-719(3).
What is "unconscionability?" The court in A & M Produce 99
gave a clear articulation of its components, which consist of a "pro-
cedural" and a "substantive" aspect. Procedural unconscionability
involves such things as oppression and surprise - oppression refer-
ring primarily to unequal bargaining power and "an absence of
meaningful choice;" surprise relating to adhesion-type form con-
tracts replete with fine print."° Substantive unconscionability re-
lates to objectively unreasonable or unexpected risk allocations, as
measured at the inception of a bargain.10 ' These factors may all
combine to produce an unconscionable exclusion of consequential
damage liability, or they may operate upon one another, as where
"the greater the unfair surprise or inequality of bargaining power,
97. See Note, The Validity of Consequential Damage Disclaimers Following Failure of
Essential Purpose of an Exclusive Remedy: S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith International, Inc., 33
Sw. L.J. 930, 933-34 (1979).
98. Primary reference is given here to the buyer's recovery of "formula" damages -
the difference in value between what he should have received and what he actually received.
99. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
100. A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486.
101. Id. at 487.
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the less [an unreasonable risk allocation] will be tolerated."' 2
Some courts, such as the Third Circuit, have embraced the lit-
eral reading of Code Section 2-719 by separately scrutinizing a
seller's performance on an exclusive remedy, and the seller's clause
limiting liability for consequential damages.103 Others have boldly
asserted that there is a mutual dependency between Sections 2-
719(2) and (3), holding that when an exclusive remedy fails of its
essential purpose, then all remedies available under the Code, in-
cluding consequential damages, are made available to the aggrieved
plaintiff (upon proper proof, of course)."° Finally, there are those
courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, which have demonstrated an un-
derstanding of the relationship between Code Sections 2-719(2) and
(3), yet have circumvented a literal reading of the Code with little
explanation. The balance of this section will undertake a closer
look at the treatment given these issues by the Third and Ninth
Circuits, respectively.
In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register,10 5 Chatlos
(the buyer) purchased a computer system which was to be installed
and programmed by NCR (the seller). The system was to perform
several routine business functions, such as accounts receiyable, pay-
roll and inventory control.10 6 There were several warranties found
to exist in the transaction, among them being an express warranty
to repair for "twelve months after delivery against defects in mate-
rial, workmanship and operational failure from ordinary use."'7
The contract also contained a clause which stated that "[i]n no
event shall NCR be liable for special or consequential damages from
any cause whatsoever."' 08 The system failed to function as war-
ranted, despite the repeated efforts of NCR to repair it. Chatlos
sued for general and consequential damages.
In finding that a breach of warranty had occurred, the court
102. Id. For excellent coverage of the issue of unconscionability and how it relates to
U.C.C. § 2-719, see generally Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The
Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REv. 28 (1977); Samuels, The Unconscio-
nability of Excluding Consequential Damages Under the UCC When No Other Meaningful
Remedy is Available, 43 U. PrrT. L. REV. 197 (1981).
103. See infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
104. See, eg., Soo Line R.R. Co., 547 F.2d 1365; John Deere Co. v. Hand, 319 N.W.2d
434 (1982); KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. IIl. 1981).
105. 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 1083.
107. Id. Other warranties included the seller's statements that the system would "solve
inventory problems, result in direct savings of labor costs, and be programmed by capable
NCR personnel to be 'up and running' (in full operation) within six months." Id.
108. Id. at 1085.
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was particularly interested in the fact that NCR's attempts to repair
spanned a year and a half. This, in the court's opinion, rendered the
repair remedy ineffective for the buyer's purposes, and the court
therefore found it to have failed of its essential purpose. 0 9 Citing
with approval from another case, it stated that "the seller does not
have an unlimited time for the performance of the obligation to re-
place and-repair parts."11
0
Considering next the separate contractual exclusion of conse-
quential damages, the Chatlos court quite succinctly and clearly
took hold of the literal nieaning of Section 2-719's provisions: "The
limited remedy of repair and a consequential damages exclusion are
two discrete ways of attempting to limit recovery for breach of war-
ranty .... The former survives unless it fails of its essential purpose,
while the latter is valid unless it is unconscionable .... The two are
not mutually exclusive.""1 '
The court found "no great disparity in the parties' bargaining
power or sophistication," and no element of "surprise," such as
might be expected in the case of "an ordinary consumer being mis-
led by a disclaimer hidden in a 'linguistic maze'."'1 12 The two ad-
versaries were "substantial business concerns," and Chatlos, in the
business of manufacturing complex electronic equipment, "had
some appreciation of the problems that might be encountered with a
computer system." ' Further, the court reasoned that "[s]ome dis-
ruption of normal business routines, expenditure of employee time,
and impairment of efficiency cannot be considered highly unusual
or unforeseeable in a faulty computer installation."
'1 14
These factors combined to convince the court in Chatlos that
the parties' contractual allocation of risk was not unconscionable,
and therefore upheld the exclusion of consequentials.1 15 For the
warranty breach, the court remanded for a determination of dam-
ages based upon U.C.C. section 2-714(2) - the difference "between
the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had
109. Id. at 1086.
110. Id. at 1085 (citing Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 n.5 (9th Cir. 1971)).
111. Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1086.
112. Id. at 1087.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Chatlos has been sharply criticized as having reached the wrong result by failing to
explore fully the doctrine of unconscionability in the context of computer technology. See
Note, U C. C. Section 2-719 as Applied to Computer Contracts - Unconscionable Exclusions
of Remedy?: Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 14 CONN. L. REV. 71
(1981).
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if they had been as warranted."'1 16
Chatlos was a clear articulation of the independence of Code
sections 2-719(2) and (3). It also represents the type of treatment
many software vendors expect from courts.
There are indeed strong arguments to support the position of
the software manufacturers. The language of Code Section 2-719(3)
suggests that limitations on damages for commercial loss are more
favorably viewed than clauses precluding recovery for personal in-
jury.'17 In addition, many industry professionals believe that the
special characteristics of computer software - sensitivity to opera-
tion on various types of peripheral hardware, the difficulty (some
would say impossibility) in writing error-free programs, the sophis-
tication required to understand documentation and use a complex
program - are such that allocations of the risk of commercial loss
are entirely reasonable. 1 8 Consequential damage limitations are,
after all, "merely an allocation of unknown or undeterminable
risks."119 The Chatlos court exhibited some awareness of the risks
inherent in relying upon computer technology by observing that
problems with faulty software "cannot be considered highly unu-
sual or unforeseeable," and are therefore "within the realm of ex-
pectable losses."' 20
Alternatively, software manufacturers will argue on a policy
level that consequential damage exclusions are crucial to their sur-
vival in a competitively and technologically dynamic market. The
New Jersey Supreme Court, expanding upon the Chatlos decision,
underscored this principle by stating: "the commercial reality is
that for many sellers, immunity from liability for their customers'
consequential damages may be indispensable to their pricing struc-
116. Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1087 (citing U.C.C. § 2-714(2)). The damages in Chatlos, prior
to determination on remand, were $57,152.76 under U.C.C. § 2-714(2) and $63,558.16 in
consequentials. Id. at 1084.
117. "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is com-
mercial is not." U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1976).
118. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text.
119. See U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1976).
120. Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1087. See also Harper Tax Services, Inc. v. Quick Tax, Ltd.,
No. Y-85-3170, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 408, 413-14 (D. Md. 1988): "[Ihe agree-
ment's exclusion of consequential damages for breach of contract is not prima facie uncon-
scionable. That the agreement was an adhesion contract - of pre-specified form and not
actually negotiated - does not lead to the conclusion that it was unconscionable.... Such
standard form agreements offer the non-drafting party the choice of accepting or rejecting the
contract as drafted.... The fairness of business deals premised upon clear allocations of risk
cannot be judged in hindsight."
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ture and, in extreme cases, to their solvency." '21 Perhaps it is not
so extreme to think that a software vendor could be rendered insol-
vent if precluded from protecting itself from incalculable losses.
One industry professional has expressed concern that although a
software company can seem large to a small company, it can also be
very small in relation to a big customer.122 In reiterating this
theme, one dissenter had this to say:
It is... obvious that many sellers of goods or providers of services
would find the risk of liability for unlimited consequential dam-
ages prohibitive. Assume, for example, that a Fortune 500 com-
pany offers a contract to a small company .... Although the
contract could be profitable for the small company, the prospect
of liability for the large company's lost profits or good will that
might result from an interruption in operations caused by faulty
software coiald be staggering. The stakes could be far too high
for a small software company. 123
With little articulation of its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit has
deviated from a strict reading of Section 2-719.
A good case to begin with is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith International, Inc. 124 In Wilson, a con-
tract was entered into whereby the seller agreed to design, build and
deliver a rock tunnel boring machine for $550,000.00.125 The
machine failed to operate properly, despite the seller's attempts to
fix it, whereupon the buyer sued for consequential damages. 26 The
contract contained an express warranty that the machine would be
free of defects in material and workmanship. 27 In addition, the
warranty provided the exclusive remedies of repair or replacement
of defective parts, and excluded seller's liability "for any loss or
damage resulting, directly or indirectly, from the use or loss of use
of the machine." '128 Although the machine was never repaired or
replaced under the terms of the warranty, and thus the exclusive
remedies failed, the court left the consequential damage limitation
intact. Holding that the inability of the seller to cure the defect did
constitute a failure of the essential purpose of the limited remedies,
121. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429, 437-38 (1987).
122. Cohen, supra note 8.
123. RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 1985) (Norris, J.,
dissenting).
124. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 1366.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1372.
128. Id.
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the court went on to conclude that the proper measure of damages
was the difference between the value of what the buyer should have
received and the value of what he got. 12 9 Unfortunately for the
plaintiff buyer, he did not include a request for such "general dam-
ages" in his complaint, and thus wound up with nothing.
The factors which influenced the court's ruling included the
relatively equal bargaining power of the parties in negotiating an
allocation of their risks of loss, the complexity of the machine (most
likely indicating the practicalities of shifting the risk), and the fact
that the seller "did not ignore his obligation to repair." 130 These
factors combined to convince the court that the risk allocation in
this case was a legally and socially acceptable arrangement. In
other words, under these circumstances, the appropriate measure of
damages was deemed to be that prescribed by Section 2-714(2) -
the monetary equivalent of the benefit of Wilson's bargain.
It seems that the buyer in Wilson got some use out of the bor-
ing machine, albeit not to the level of performance bargained for.
The machine "bored at a rate slower than the expected 2.5 feet per
hour, overheated, broke down, and wore out blades faster than had
been projected."' 3 1 The inability of the seller to repair the defects,
according to the court, caused the buyer to lose "a substantial bene-
fit of his bargain,"'132 yet "[tihe default of the seller was not so total
and fundamental as to require that its consequential damage limita-
tion be expunged from the contract."'133
Another Ninth Circuit case, RRX Industries v. Lab-Con,
Inc. 134 was contractually similar to Wilson, yet an opposite result
was reached as to damages.
RRX involved a negotiated software contract, in which RRX
agreed to purchase a system for use in its medical laboratories. Spe-
cifically, the software was to perform several simultaneous complex
functions, including technical calculations, billing, and account-
ing. 1 35 The contract contained an exclusive repair remedy, obligat-
ing Lab-Con to correct any "bugs" found to exist, and also limited
Lab-Con's liability to the purchase price of the system.136 The
129. Id. at 1375.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1368.
132. Id. at 1375.
133. Id.
134. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
135. Telephone interview with Joseph T. Kelley, Jr., attorney for Lab-Con, Inc. (Jan. 5,
1989).
136. The clause provided:
1989]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
software developed numerous "bugs," which Lab-Con was unable
to repair. RRX sued for general and consequential damages. The
court sided with the buyer.
In an attempt to evince some understanding of the distinction
between Sections 2-719(2) and (3), the appellate court confusingly
stated:
'[S]ince the defendants were either unwilling or unable to provide
a system as represented, or to fix the "bugs" in the software, these
limited remedies failed of their essential purpose. .. ' This is a
finding that both limited remedies failed of their essential pur-
pose. The trial judge did not state that because the repair remedy
failed, the limitation of damages provision should not be en-
forced. (Emphasis in original.) 137
The court was apparently of the opinion that Lab-Con's de-
fault in this case was "total and fundamental" - its code for: All
damages allowed. That this is the language of unconscionability is
suggested by the court's further comment that U.C.C. Section 2-
719(2) "provides an independent limit [upon the ability of a seller to
exclude consequential damages] when circumstances render a dam-
ages limitation clause oppressive and invalid." (Emphasis added.) 38
The reasoning chosen by the court in RRX is unfortunate, be-
cause it fosters misunderstanding about the relationship between
Sections 2-719(2) and (3). The court speaks the language of uncon-
scionability, while dealing with the inability of the seller to effectu-
ate the exclusive remedy - a reference to the failure of the remedy
to fulfill its essential purpose.
Even if the court had appropriately analyzed the Code's provi-
sions (by separately scrutinizing them), why was the general mea-
sure of damages - the difference in value between the program as
warranted, and what RRX received (or, in this case, the contract
price) - inadequate? In other words, why was the court willing to
upset a bargained-for allocation of risk?
The facts indicate that, along with the basic software system,
RRX was to receive a considerable amount of technical support and
"4. [Lab-Con] warrants that the software shall be free of programming 'bugs'
for the term of the license, and that [Lab-Con] shall correct any such program-
ming 'bugs'... at no cost to User. The liability of [Lab-Con] under this war-
ranty, or under other warrant [sic] expressed or implied shall be limited in
amount to $52,300.00 or such lesser sum that shall have actually been paid by
User to [Lab-Con] pursuant to Paragraph 5 of this Agreement."
RRX, 772 F.2d at 548.
137. Id. at 547.
138. Id.
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additional program capabilities. According to the District Court's
findings of fact, Lab-Con was to provide maintenance, cables and
connections, two more software functions, timely installation, and
"adequate" training."' One can only surmise that, having failed to
provide these support services, RRX was deprived not only of a
substantial benefit of its bargain, but of any bargain at all. Accord-
ing to the District Court:
Defendant's breaches.. .prevented RRX from receiving what it
had bargained for - a bug free, well maintained, complete labo-
ratory software system, that would permit it to reliably and effi-
ciently automate its laboratory. There were continual bugs in the
result report portion of the program as well as a total failure of
the software to provide Medi-Cal billing and provide physical
billing. As a result, RRX had to expend consider[able] man-
hours manually generating the bills the system was supposed to
generate. As a result of the Lab-Con system's failure to meet
RRX's billing needs, the system was of no practical value to
RRX. (Emphasis added.) 14°
Consequentials awarded in RRX were for employee and execu-
tive overtime in attempting to rectify the program's problems, and
such "additional costs" as long-distance telephone expenses.
1 41
While the risk allocation was valid at its inception, to the extent
that RRX agreed to shoulder the risk of consequential loss while
repairs were made, it is reasonable to suspect that the court disfa-
vored an apparent disappointment of the buyer's basic assump-
tions.142 In other words, it is unlikely that RRX in fact agreed to
assume liability for "open-ended consequential losses." '143
There was no evidence before the court in RRX regarding the
relative sophistication of the bargaining parties. It is possible, how-
ever, that equitable solutions were sought to remedy a perceived
knowledge gap. If this were a first-time effort by RRX to automate
its laboratory, then perhaps Lab-Con was in the best position to
alleviate the buyer's consequential losses. The detailed listing of
support services in the contract seems to indicate a great deal of
reliance upon the seller's superior knowledge of the system. 1" On
139. RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., No. CV-82-5375 at 86-92 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12,
1983).
140. Id. at 92.
141. Id. at 93. The contract price was $40,866.66. Total damages awarded amounted to
$48,223.05. The fight on appeal was over the difference ($7,456.39). RRX, 772 F.2d at 548.
142. See Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure on Purpose: A
Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759, 776 (1977).
143. Id.
144. See RRX, No. CV-82-5375 at 86-92 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1983). See also Marzouk,
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the other hand, the obvious complexity and uniqueness of this
software package bespeaks the commercial reasonableness of plac-
ing a cap on the seller's liability."1 In the absence of any meaning-
ful discussion by the court in RRX, it is difficult accurately to assess
its conclusion, other than to alert software vendors to their poten-
tial consequential damage exposure for "total and fundamental"
software failures.
It will be interesting to see how the Ninth Circuit treats Geo-
physical Sys. Corp. v. Seismograph Serv. Corp., 146 asuuming the case
comes before it. This case involved a highly specialized computer
system, consisting of both "packaged" and custom software.'47 The
system was designed to interpret, manipulate, and output seismic
data collected in the field, depending upon criteria selected by the
user."a  The alleged failure was based upon the system's inability
"adequately" to process data, primarily at an effective speed.1 49
Damages awarded to the plaintiff were substantial."'
The warranty in this case provided that the system would be
free of defects in materials and workmanship for a specified period,
and further provided the limited remedies of repair or replace-
ment. 151 The seller was apparently unable to repair 1 2 and unwill-
ing to replace the system.' 53 Since no special interrogatories were
sent to the jury, it must be assumed that the issue of the warranty's
essential purpose occupied at least a portion of the deliberations,
and was deemed to have failed in this regard.
Rinkerman & Porter, Unconscionability and Computer Contracts with Small Businesses, I
COMPUTER L. REP. 11 (1983) (discussing the technological disadvantage suffered by many
businesses when negotiating for computer products and services).
145. "[Ihe rule that the agreed-upon allocation of commercial risk should not be dis-
turbed is particularly appropriate where, as here, the warranted item is a highly complex,
sophisticated and in some ways experimental piece of equipment. Moreover, compliance
with a warranty to repair or replace must depend on the type of machinery in issue. In the
case of a multi-million dollar turbine-generator, we are not dealing with a piece of equipment
that either works or does not, or is fully repaired or not at all. On the contrary, the normal
operation of a turbine-generator spans too large a spectrum for such simple characteriza-
tions." Kearney & Trecker v. Master Engraving, 527 A.2d 429, 438 (1987) (quoting Ameri-
can Elec. Power v. Westinghouse Elec., 418 F. Supp. 435, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
146. No. CV-85-8359 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1988).
147. Telephone interview with Robert Badel, attorney for Geophysical Sys. Corp. (Feb.
6, 1989).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. Seismograph had dispatched a permanent on-site technical assistant to help Geo-
physical keep the system running, but apparently to little avail.
153. Geophysical unsuccessfully sought a refund. Bulkeley, supra note 49. Presumably,
Geophysical also never received a new system.
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Significantly, there was no separate exclusion of consequential
damages,"5 4 and this likely hurt the defendant's case as to damages.
Seismograph unsuccessfully argued that the "repair or replace" pro-
vision served to limit its liability by providing Geophysical with its
sole and exclusive remedy. 5 The jury was instructed that all dam-
ages under the U.C.C. were available where a limited remedy fails
of its essential purpose.15 6
There were several contracts binding these parties." 7 For rea-
sons unrelated to this comment, the trial judge permitted only the
contract without a consequential damage exclusion to be considered
by the jury (the others containing such exclusions). 5 Assuming,
arguendo, the success of an equitable reformation of the contract to
include the exclusion of consequentials (by prior course of dealing),
there are good arguments for a modification of the award..
Geophysical is an oil exploration firm, with extensive knowl-
edge of computerized seismic data interpretation.' 59 In fact, an ex-
pert user is required to make effective use of the software designed
for this purpose. 1" Thus, there does not appear to have been any
unconscionable disparity in bargaining positions. Further, these
computer programs require a high degree of user intervention and
configuration 161-factors which favor placing the risk of conse-
quential losses on the buyer. More importantly perhaps for the
Ninth Circuit is the fact that the programs continued to process
data and yield marketable results, though at less-than-expected per-
formance efficiency. 62 In other words, there does not appear to
have been a "total and fundamental failure" of the system. 63 In
this respect, the case is more similar to Wilson than to RRX
154. Telephone interview with David A. Hacker, attorney for Seismograph Serv. Corp.
(Feb. 6, 1989).
155. Badel, supra note 147.
156. Id. It is unclear whether this instruction was given in view of the absence of a
consequential damage exclusion, nor which jurisdiction's law it purports to reflect.
157. Hacker, supra note 154.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. It should be noted that other issues were argued by Geophysical with considerable
success. For example, according to the attorney for Geophysical, the jury was quite respon-
sive to his emphasis on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Badel, supra note
147.
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR A BALANCED APPROACH
As the status of computer software continues to evolve from
that of a time-saving convenience to a necessary commodity, there
is every reason to believe that issues of liability for program failures
will receive increased attention. It is already becoming evident that
software vendors are exposed not only for liability resulting from
actual defects in their products, but also for errors in the substan-
tive guidance given by many programs.' 64 One example of this is
reflected in a recent Revenue Ruling, which concluded that the de-
veloper of a computer program used for preparing tax returns may
be held liable as an income tax preparer for any errors based upon
the program's instructions. 165 In that case, a software developer
had designed a program which explained the requirements for each
line of a tax form. The user then entered figures based on that in-
formation, and the program converted and printed the proper
figures for all lines of a tax return.'6 6 The problem was that the
software developer failed to reprogram the software to reflect a
change in the tax laws, which resulted in understatements of tax
liability by users of the product.' 67 The IRS held that the software
developer was an income tax preparer, and that he could be liable
for the understated taxes if there was a negligent or intentional dis-
regard of IRS rules or regulations.' 68 In light of this example,
software vendors of these types of programs ought to be aware of
the heightened possibility for consequential damage liability.
Given the virtual inevitability of software errors at some point
in time,169 and the ever-increasing number of end-users, it will not
be long before the array of fact situations coming before the courts
acquire an air of familiarity. The inevitable social and economic
costs that accompany sustained battles between consumer protec-
tion and industry groups will soon alert state and federal legislators
to the need for legal reform in the area of computer software. Such
legislation, if written with due regard to the compelling interests of
a variety of players, could serve a useful purpose. In the interim,
the solution must be an "internal" system of reform, whereby risks
can be more equitably distributed and absorbed.
164. Greg & Folk, Liability for Substantive Errors in Computer Software, 5 COMPUTER
L. REP. 1, 18 (1986).
165. Rev. Rul. 85-189, 1985-48 I.R.B. 8 (Dec. 2, 1985); see generally Greg & Folk, supra
note 164, for a more thorough analysis of this ruling.
166. Greg & Folk, supra note 164.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 19.
169. See Meeting, supra note 23, at 4.
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A. Suggestions for Vendors
One very simple risk management solution, as suggested by the
court in A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 70 would be for vendors
to take the "surprise" out of their warranties by ensuring they are
read and understood by the customer. This might very well provide
the industry with incentive to compete for customers by providing
clearly written and fair warranties; they would become marketing
issues as opposed to legal issues. As software grows in complexity,
and consumers become more sophisticated in terms of what they
expect from the products, prudent management would seem to dic-
tate a higher level of sensitivity to the need for honest sharing of
vital information.
One software engineer has suggested that warranties describe
what the product will not do, as well as what it may be expected to
do. '7 The more information the consumer has about a product's
capabilities - the more notice he has of what to expect and what not
to expect - the more justified will be a risk-shifting warranty provi-
sion. If a software manufacturer wishes to be fairly treated by a
court, he must imbue himself with the perception that he has been
fair with his customers. It is not the province of the courts to dic-
tate the substance of warranties, but only to pass judgement as to
their fairness and effectiveness. The problems of unconscionability
and warranty failures are particularly evident where software is
mass marketed, and standard, non-negotiated warranties are pro-
vided. These problems can be ameliorated if substantial and rele-
vant information has been shared with the consumer.
Naturally, software should perform the way consumers expect
that it will. These expectations, however, are fully controlled by the
information disseminated by the manufacturers; they are the one's
who create excitement about new program achievements. If the
producers of the software feel that their product is evolutionary and
incomplete (which may be inevitable in an industry where new tech-
nologies are constantly defining enhanced capabilities), then efforts
to convey this to the buyer should be vigorously pursued. Software
documents should include the caveat that comprehensive programs
are not to be exclusively relied upon due to their inherently complex
nature. In this regard, consumers ought to be made aware of their
roles and responsibilities in an evolutionary market. Users must be
told that, to ensure accuracy, computer generated information re-
170. 135 Cal. App. 3d at 490, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
171. Hearing, supra note 20, at 164 (comments of Ronald Braithwaite, Rising Star
Industries).
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quires independent verification for the first several months of opera-
tion, particularly in situations where it is known that errors will
cause serious commercial losses. In addition, users must be ex-
pressly and strenuously encouraged to report recurring errors,
which provides vital detection information for subsequent repairs.
Such "disclaiming" language should serve the added purpose of
narrowing the manufacturer's liability. The user in possession of
this kind of information may fairly be regarded as "informed" and
thus more in control of his decision to accept a risk of loss.
Vendors should not underestimate the gratitude of an informed
consumer, nor the willingness of a court to reward for divulgence in
a commercial or consumer transaction. A carefully worded war-
ranty document need not deter a potential purchaser for fear of pro-
gram error. A simple explanation that the program in question has
been fully tested to the maximum extent possible should suffice as a
balance against information regarding the risks inherent in relying
on a technologically sensitive product.
With respect to risk management, vendors can take greater
measures to lessen the prospect of program failures by expanding
the testing phase of program development. While it remains virtu-
ally impossible to test a commercial computer program for every
conceivable application by a user, including the panoply of hard-
ware and peripherals it will inevitably be subjected to, those func-
tions for which a program is primarily designed can be submitted to
an independent testing organization, which can then certify by
means of a visible seal that the program is reliable for particular
specifications.' 72 Vendors may then set out these specifications, and
warrant that the product will perform in accordance therewith.
The risk that a program will fail if used in a manner outside the
program's specifications may then be justifiably shifted to the user.
Note here that failure to take such testing precautions might subject
the manufacturer to greater liability in any event.
This suggestion may be subject to the criticism that such in-
dependent "seals of approval" would nullify the value inherent in
name-brand goods. A large part of a company's reputation is de-
rived from its ability to develop and market quality products,
thereby inducing the allegiance of customers. The fact that a prod-
uct has been independently certified as operationally sound merely
reaffirms the abilities of the software developer, not the one who
tested it. Consistently favorable testing results from a reliable and
172. See Rinkerman, Potential Liabilities of Independent Software Testing and Certifca.
tion Organizations, 1 COMPUTER L. REP. 725 (1983).
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trustworthy testing organization would reflect most favorably upon
the name that produced the product. If the idea of independent
testing is still unpalatable to a manufacturer, then efforts should be
made to concentrate substantially on in-house testing to achieve
similar quality results, and should be used as competitive marketing
tools.
In addition to providing significant information and vigorously
pursuing quality standards, software manufacturers must provide
fair and adequate remedies to the consumer in the event of a pro-
gram failure. Judicial acceptance of warranties which completely
shift all risk of loss to a consumer, in a mass-market arrangement, is
extremely unlikely in virtually any jurisdiction.
If a manufacturer wishes to preserve the option of insulating
itself from liability for consequential damages, it must pay signifi-
cant attention to the way in which the warranty is drafted. The
previous discussion of judicial analysis on this question' 73 should
serve to highlight the importance of fairness in this regard. Indus-
try professionals must move away from erring on the side of total
risk allocation to the buyer, and begin offering reasonable remedies
in the event of program failures. In addition to providing exclusive
remedies of repair or replacement, which we have seen may not al-
ways guarantee the integrity of a consequential damages exclusion,
additional remedies should be offered, such as enhanced support
services. Conscionability problems could be significantly mitigated
with each additional remedy provided by a warranty.
B. Suggestions for End-Users
The buyers of software programs must take a fair measure of
responsibility for their decisions to rely upon these complex prod-
ucts. There is much opportunity for mitigation of losses with which
users may be charged, as software continues to proliferate, and
common understanding of the risks increases. The concepts of
computer backup and disaster recovery agreements by computer-
dependent users should begin to take hold.174 These types of agree-
ments may take several forms. For example, there are reciprocal
agreements whereby one company may undertake to process the
billing or payroll of another in the event that the latter temporarily
loses use of its computer. 175 There are also disaster recovery yen-
173. See supra notes 88-163 and accompanying text.
174. Feldheim, Computer Backup and Disaster Recovery Agreements, 24 JURIMETRICS J.
210 (1984).
175. Id. at 211.
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dors, whose vocation it is to provide "empty shells" - buildings
which contain only computer equipment of various sorts, which can
be accessed by users who have lost use of their own equipment. '76
Costs of maintenance can be managed by forming "clubs" of users,
or through intermittent lease arrangements with independent third-
party vendors.1 77 It may be that if such cooperative arrangements
become institutionalized and wide-spread, they may be looked upon
by courts as viable methods of loss mitigation, and thus would serve
a purposeful role in limiting the liability of the software vendors. In
other words, buyers ought to be aware of the fact that they may be
found to have been in a better position than the manufacturer to
absorb a loss. The buyer should thus expend at least minimal ef-
forts exploring these options.
Another prudent protective measure a computer-dependent
user should consider is the acquisition of processing insurance.
With such coverage, a user who is vulnerable to commercial loss in
the event of a program failure may be assured of faster recovery,
and be spared the expense of litigating a claim with a software man-
ufacturer. Again, the user must at least consider this option, since
he may reasonably be viewed as having been in the best position to
obtain the coverage - a factor which cuts in favor of limiting the
liability of the manufacturer.
VI. CONCLUSION
If there is one conclusion to be drawn, it is that fairness is the
key to stability in a market context such as this. Vendors must be
sensitive to the fact that their software products are evolving from
being mere tools to the point of substantial integration into the lives
of users (and beneficiaries of software use), and users must realize
that they are making conscious, risk-taking decisions by relying on
incalculably complex technology. The potential legal consequences
of ignoring this balance can be staggering. Software vendors would
have a short life span if forced to act as insurers, and consumers
would unfairly suffer if foreclosed from proper legal remedies for
significant harms. The key is a more aggressive undertaking on the
part of software manufacturers to share relevant information, and a
more prudent undertaking on the part of software users to acquire
the information necessary to satisfy themselves that their expecta-
tions will be adequately met.
176. Id. at 212.
177. Id.
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